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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  consider  the provision  of  deposit  insurance  as  the  outcome  of  a non-cooperative  policy  game between
nations.  Nations  compete  for  deposits  in  order to protect  their  banking  systems  from  the  destabilizing
impact  of  potential  capital  ﬂight.  Policies  are  chosen  to  attract  depositors  who optimally  respond  to
the  expected  return  to deposits,  which  depends  on deposit  insurance  levels,  systemic  risk  and  transac-
tion  costs.  We  identify  both  defensive  and beggar-thy-neighbour  policies.  The  model  sheds  light  on  the
European  banking  crisis  of 2008  in which  individual  nations  ratcheted  up their  deposit  insurance  levels.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.28
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. Introduction
Germany’s surprise decision to guarantee retail deposits came
after it loudly denounced Ireland’s beggar-thy-neighbour deci-
sions to guarantee the liabilities of its banks. Germany’s
volte-face may  have been prompted by a large number of elec-
tronic withdrawals of deposits at the weekend, said Nigel Myer,
an analyst at Dresdner Kleinwort in London. The Economist
(2008)
On 30 September 2008, in the midst of the recent global ﬁnan-
ial crisis, the government of Ireland unexpectedly guaranteed all
eposits at their six largest banks. Within a few days several other
uropean Union (EU) member states responded by also increasing
heir deposit insurance. In particular, on 5 October 2008 Germany
uaranteed all deposits held at their domestic banks. The lead quote
trongly suggests that noncooperation in setting deposit insurance
           
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Victoria, P.O. Box 1700, Victoria, BC,
anada V8W 2Y2. Tel.: +1 250 721 8535; fax: +1 250 721 6214.
E-mail address: schure@uvic.ca (P. Schure).
g
i
F
d
a
r
i
t
r
r
572-3089
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.10.001
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND lippears to have contributed, at least temporarily, to destabilizing
uropean banking.
Motivated by the European banking crisis of 2008, this paper
evelops a positive theory of deposit insurance provision. In partic-
lar, we develop a two-country model in which countries compete
or deposits by setting deposit insurance levels non-cooperatively.
epositors invest in the country that offers the highest expected
eturn on investments in deposits, which depends on the return on
anking as well as deposit insurance levels. The analysis provides
n international political economy explanation for deposit insur-
nce, whereas standard theories focus on normative (efﬁciency)
ationales for deposit insurance. Our paper contributes to the lit-
rature by modelling the optimizing behaviour of depositors and
overnments in responding to and setting national levels of deposit
nsurance. The theory applies to some bank safety nets as well.
Our analysis starts with a scenario similar to the leading quote.
irst, the foreign country (e.g. Ireland) exogenously declares full
eposit insurance. The home country’s (e.g. German) government
nticipates a loss of deposits to the foreign country were it not to
espond. A loss of deposits would stress the home country’s bank-
ng system exposing it to a greater probability of failing. When
he probability of failing becomes sufﬁciently high, the optimal
esponse is to raise the level of the home deposit insurance so as to
etain all local deposits.
cense.
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documents the relevant events around the European banking crisis
of 2008. Section 6 applies the model to analyze the European crisis
and develops beggar-thy-neighbour versions of the model. Section
2 Capital adequacy regulation has received considerable attention. Acharya
(2003) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) examine international bank regula-
tor competition in models with capital adequacy regulation but without deposit
insurance and multinational banks. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) examine the
gains from international cooperation on capital adequacy regulation. Acharya (2003)
shows that cooperation between countries on capital requirements can result in a
worse outcome of their non-cooperative game of extending forbearance (or not) of
their banks.
3 In Calzolari and Loranth (2011) prudential regulation is chosen to minimize the
cost of providing full deposit insurance. Under complete information, they show
that the host country regulator of a subsidiary-organized bank has less incentive
to  intervene than the originating country regulator of a branch-organized multina-
tional bank. With incomplete information the results are complicated by the fact
that  intervention may  impede good quality bank projects rather than just limit
losses of bad quality investments. Mälkönen and Niinimäki (2012) examine a Nash
bargaining game in which countries share the recapitalize costs of an insolvent
multinational bank. The originating country regulator’s threat to close the bankM.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
In the model, deposit insurance involves a net cost to society
ecause its funding involves a deadweight loss. By construction, it
s suboptimal for a country to provide funding for (effective) deposit
nsurance in the absence of international competition for deposits.
ith international competition, deposit insurance funding may
r may  not be provided. It is not provided if countries are sufﬁ-
iently symmetric. This ineffective deposit insurance equilibrium
s welfare maximizing and we argue that it roughly describes the
ituation in the EU before 2007 where most countries set deposit
uarantees quite low at D 20,000 per depositor. Such a low guaran-
ee requires little or no government funding as, even in a major
risis, the residual value of bank assets would likely cover the
mount promised to depositors.
We  next investigate whether our model can also explain why
he foreign country would, in the ﬁrst place, unilaterally increase
ts deposit insurance from a low level to full deposit insurance. We
nd that shocks that impact the home and foreign banking sectors
symmetrically are one possible way to rationalize the increase.
he foreign government may  increase its deposit insurance cov-
rage purely as a defensive measure to ensure that their citizens
ontinue to deposit domestically. In this case, attracting foreign
eposits is actually a negative side effect from a high level of deposit
nsurance, because it makes funding the deposit insurance scheme
ore expensive. The increase in deposit insurance levels during the
risis could have also been the result from a beggar-thy-neighbour
otive, possibly arising from a prisoner’s dilemma situation. How-
ver, as we show, if the beggar-thy-neighbour policy were only
rom Ireland, as suggested in the lead quote, then the situation
oes not explain Ireland’s move to full deposit insurance if Ireland
nticipated Germany’s volte-face.1
Research in the area of regulatory competition points to
he importance of international spillovers in banking. Huizinga
nd Nicodeme (2006) examine how national deposit insurance
chemes affect the location of international deposits. They ﬁnd
hat depositors are attracted to countries with explicit deposit
nsurance schemes. King (2012) analyzes the impact of the com-
rehensive banking sector rescue packages announced in October
008. Using a sample of 78 large ﬁnancial institutions in 12 OECD
ountries, he ﬁnds that the rescue packages affected the funding
osts of banks (credit default swap spreads) differentially across
ountries. He also ﬁnds a negative correlation of bank stock returns
round the announcement moments and interprets this as sug-
esting “blleft . . . cross-border competition effects, with banks
eceiving favourable government support outperforming foreign
ivals.” Issues regarding regulatory competition are highly rele-
ant to the EU due to the required mutual recognition of member
tate ﬁnancial services. The 1994 EU deposit-guarantee directive
equired that Eurozone member states cover bank deposits of at
east 20,000 Euros per individual (European Union, 1994). This
irective, however, did not set an upper limit on the level of deposit
nsurance, or harmonized other features of the schemes, leaving
cope for international competition between members states. This
nd other problems with cross-border banking in Europe have been
iscussed by Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2008), the Forum on Cross-
order Financial Groups (2009), European Commission (2010), and
llen et al. (2011). Section 5 describes the European situation in
ore detail.
The theoretical literature on cross-border banking competi-
ion concentrates on bank capital adequacy assuming no deposit
1 The alternative view, suggested by normative banking models, is that countries
aised their deposit insurance levels independently of each other, presumably in
eaction to a common shock. We contrast our approach with normative bank-
ng  models in Section 3.3 and discuss the implications of these complementary
pproaches for understanding the European banking crisis of 2008 in the conclusion.
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nsurance2 and multi-national banking assuming complete deposit
nsurance.3 An exception is Hardy and Nieto (2011). In their anal-
sis, national regulators competitively choose the levels of deposit
nsurance and levels of bank supervision. By assumption tighter
upervision reduces simultaneously the probability of systemic
ailure and the productivity of the sector. Deposit insurance is
ssumed to (i) increase the probability of a systemic failure, the
resumed effect of deposit insurance inducing moral hazard, but
lso (ii) reduce the ex post cost associated with a systemic cri-
is. Externalities connect the countries. An increase in the home
evel of deposit insurance increases the probability of losses in the
oreign country, an assumption based on the observation that a cri-
is in one country often spills over to other countries. Supervision
enerates a positive externality. With these assumed externalities,
ardy and Nieto (2011) ﬁnd that greater international cooperation
ould result in lower levels of deposit insurance and higher levels
f supervision than non-cooperation.
Our paper focuses on the competitive game between govern-
ents. National governments choose the level of deposit insurance
o maximize their citizens welfare, taking into account the endoge-
ous behaviour of utility maximizing depositors. We  ignore moral
azard issues. Countries are linked through international deposit
ows. Adding the layer of international competition for deposits
enerates a complex regulatory game, even though we discipline
he analysis by excluding panic-based bank runs which are cus-
omary in normative models of deposit insurance.4 By excluding
oral hazard and panic-based runs, the model highlights our
nternational political economy explanation for the existence of
eposit insurance. Although the focus is on the positive analysis
f deposit insurance competition, we  also explore some welfare
ssues.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the frame-
ork. Section 3 examines the equilibrium response of the home
overnment to foreign full deposit insurance and contrasts our
pproach with other banking models. Section 4 solves the general
odel and examines the efﬁciency of the policy equilibria. Section 5nduces the host regulator to cooperate in the recapitalization. The recapitalization
ame affects the incentive to offer a blanket guarantee. Bruche and Suarez (2010)
how how the insurance of retail deposits, but not wholesale deposits, contributes
o greater differences in the funding costs across the banking sectors of EU member
tates.
4 See Section 3.3 for the contrast with standard normative models including
iamond and Dybvig (1983). Recently, White and Morrison (2011) provide a new
ormative rationale for deposit insurance. In a model with both moral hazard and
dverse selection, they show that government provided deposit insurance can act
s  an efﬁcient subsidized recapitalization. In our model, governments can subsidize
omestic banks through deposit insurance. In contrast to Morrison and White such
ubsidies are inefﬁcient and motivated by interjurisdictional competition.
5  Finan
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ratio b/p often appears in the analysis, and we  refer it to as the stress
ratio. The higher is the stress ratio, the greater is the relative risk of
banking system failure from the home loose depositing abroad.
7 This banking sector characterization can be derived from a large number of
competitive identical banks where each invests in an uncertain home productive
investment project. Each bank’s project has two possible outcomes as described32 M.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
 concludes by looking at the strengths and weakness of our polit-
cal economy approach to understanding the provision of deposit
nsurance.
. The framework
.1. Overview
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, and each chooses
heir deposit insurance policy, d and d*, respectively.5 Depositors
hoose whether to deposit at home or abroad given these policies.
he timing of actions and events is as follows.
tage 1 Home and Foreign governments simultaneously set
deposit insurance policies d and d*.
tage 2 Banking subgame; depositors choose whether to deposit
in the Home or Foreign banking sector. Banking returns
are realized afterwards.
In order to keep the analysis tractable, we keep the banking sub-
ame as simple as possible. Like Acharya (2009) depositors are risk
eutral and invest in one-period bank debt contracts because they
ave no other opportunities.6 There is no liquidity risk interme-
iation in our model, and no interim period in which information
s revealed about the ﬁtness of assets, banks or managers. These
eatures would only complicate the analysis while obscuring the
eneral character of our results.
.2. Depositors
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral depositors in each country
nd each depositor is endowed with 1 unit of a homogenous good.
epositors maximize their expected return by choosing to either
nvest in a home bank or a foreign bank. A depositor choosing to
nvest abroad incurs a transaction cost, which captures the extra
osts of holding savings aboard, including the shoe-leather costs of
aintaining deposits in a system that is dissimilar and remote. Note
hat total world deposits sum to 2 units since depositors deposit
ither domestically or abroad.
We distinguish a depositor’s type according to the transaction
ost they face. The home country’s population is divided into two
ypes: bound depositors and loose depositors. Bound depositors face
 large transaction cost so that they never move their deposits
broad. By contrast, loose depositors are footloose as they face a
elatively low transaction cost ε > 0 of depositing abroad. Transac-
ions costs differ between bound and loose depositors because they
ay  differ in sophistication (e.g. language and internet banking
bilities) or have different opportunities (e.g. access to banks and
awyers). Bound depositors consist of proportion B ∈ (0, 1) of the
ome population and the remaining mass of 1 − B are loose depos-
tors. The population in the foreign country is similarly described
nd has B* ∈ (0, 1) bound and 1 − B* loose depositors.
5 Foreign variables will be marked by an asterisk superscript. Under our assump-
ions it is sufﬁcient to model just one foreign country, the one with the highest level
f  deposit insurance.
6 In Section 3.3 we show that introducing “storage” as an alternative asset does
ot  change our general results. The lack of viable alternative investments could be
ustiﬁed by banks having expertise in investments or by investments being lumpy
nd  too large for individual investors. Allen and Gale (1998) appeal to extreme
dverse selection and that only banks can distinguish genuine risky assets from
hose without value.
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.3. Banking
Assume a perfectly competitive home banking system with no
ankruptcy or operating costs. The banking system funnels the
vailable deposits into an investment project that has two pos-
ible outcomes to capture systemic risk. With probability P one
nit invested yields a low gross return of r > 0, and with probability
 − P it yields a high gross return R > 1 where R > r. We  refer to the
igh return state as “success” and the low return state as “failure”,
ut r ≥ 1 is possible; absolute losses do not drive our results. Banks
ssue debt contracts promising gross return R: with success banks
ay out in full, and with failure depositors claim the residual r.7
Prior to the European banking crisis of 2008, large real and ﬁnan-
ial negative shocks had shaken the world economy, and systemic
isk to national ﬁnancial systems was  widely perceived to be a
oncern.8 Thus, we assume that the probability of banking system
ailure is positive, P > 0. It is likely that P was perceived to be quite
ensitive to the level of domestic deposits, denoted D. Were sub-
tantial funds to ﬂee abroad, the level of domestic deposits would
ubstantially decrease (directly by withdrawals or indirectly by
eductions in redeposits of maturing short-term paper). A frighten-
ng consequence would be the rapid deleveraging of home banks’
alance sheets resulting in the lowering of asset prices, credit and
ggregate output which would compromise the banking system.
he assumptions on P are formalized below and examined further
n Section 3.3.
We  suppose the probability of banking system failure, P, is
nversely related to the aggregate level of deposits, denoted D.
peciﬁcally, assume that P(D + D) ≤ P(D) for small D > 0 over
he range D ∈ [B, 2 − B*], and the probability function satisﬁes the
ollowing:
 < P(2 − B∗) ≡ g ≤ P(1) ≡ p < P(B) ≡ b ≤ 1,
here 0 < g ≤ p < b ≤ 1 represent key probabilities. Here b is the
robability of systemic failure when only bound agents deposit in
he home country, D = B < 1. The special case b = 1 corresponds to
ertain systemic failure if D = B. When all home agents deposit at
ome, D = 1, the banking system is more stable by assumption as
 < b. If g < p, then home banking stability further increases with the
nﬂux of 1 − B* foreign loose depositors. Later in the paper, we con-
entrate on the case g = p which captures an assumption that scale
conomies were already in place before the crisis, hence attract-
ng deposits from abroad would not enhance stability. Finally, thebove. As depositors are risk-neutral, there is a competitive equilibrium in which
he returns are paid to investors. Thus, assume banks issue debt contracts promising
ross return R: with success banks pay out in full, and with failure depositors claim
he  residual r
 This simple model is consistent with any correlation of realized returns among
anks. However, in the context of the European crisis it is natural to think of P
apturing systemic risk and the correlation of returns being high (from macro events
nd/or individual bank failure bringing down the banking system).
8 Widespread concerns about a sudden increase in systemic risk are documented
n  International Monetary Fund (2008) “Global Financial Stability Report: Contain-
ng Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness”. How the dramatic fall in
ommodity prices lead to a collapse in shipping rates world wide is described by
lenys (2008). Referring to shipping rates in Northern Europe she writes, “The Baltic
ry Index fell 66 percent in the three months to Sept 30, the largest quarterly drop
ince the exchange began compiling the data.” Among other ﬁnancial shocks was
he  collapse of US investment banks in mid  September 2008.
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ε < p(R − r) ≡ ε¯ (1)
where ε¯ > 0 as p > 0 and R > r. Henceforth 0 < ε < ε¯ is assumed.M.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
The foreign banking system is treated symmetrically. The for-
ign failure function is P* = P*(D*), where D* is the level of deposits
eld at foreign banks. The parameter g* may  differ from g, p* from p,
nd b* from b. We  assume R* = R and r* = r, so that the probabilities
f failure, P(D) and P*(D*), are the only source for differences in the
xpected returns across countries.9
.4. Deposit insurance
In reality there are quite a few design features of deposit insur-
nce schemes (Demirgüc¸ -Kunt et al., 2008), including some that
ay  affect international deposit ﬂows. In our model, governments
hoose only the deposit insurance coverage. They are not allowed
o discriminate between depositors by nationality, as is the case
n the EU. Thus, if home loose depositors deposit in the foreign
ountry they receive the same insurance payout, if any, as the local
epositors there.
Deposit insurance coverage d is expressed as a fraction of the
ontracted gross return R. Thus, deposit insurance promises a
epayment of dR and is said to be effective when it yields depositors
ore than what they can get from their failed bank, i.e. when dR > r.
verall, deposit insurance provides max  [0, dR − r] additional funds
n top of r, such that the depositors receive max  [r, dR]. Henceforth
e restrict deposit insurance to the range (r/R) ≤ d ≤ 1 and repre-
ent the ineffective deposit insurance rate by d = r/R. This assumption
s made without loss of generality and allows us to drop the max-
mum operator in our equations. The construction is the same for
he foreign deposit insurance rate: (r/R) ≤ d* ≤ 1. Deposit insurance
s funded by taxes.
.5. Citizens and government
The expected utilities of bound and loose home citizens are
espectively:
B = (1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR − T, and
L = max
{
(1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR, (1 − P∗(D∗))R
+P∗(D∗)d∗R − ε
}
− T,
here T is the expected tax burden on each home citizen. The home
ound have no choice but to deposit in the home banking system.
he home loose deposit in the country which gives them the highest
xpected return. However, they cannot escape local taxation by
epositing abroad.
The home government’s objective function is the sum of the
xpected utilities of its citizens:
 = BUB + (1 − B)UL.
he government budget constraint requires that the expected tax
urden equals the expected cost of providing deposit insurance:
 = (1 + c)P(D)D(dR − r)
here c ≥ 0 is the deadweight loss from taxation expressed. It is
he net marginal cost of funding deposit insurance. The expected
ax burden is positive only if deposit insurance is effective, d > (r/R).
overnment policy reduces to the choice of d ∈ [r/R, 1] as explained
n Section 3.2.
9 Depositors are risk neutral and do not care about the correlation of failures
cross countries. The ﬁxed transaction cost makes it optimal for them to invest
n one country. Risk adverse agents would diversify their deposit holdings across
ountries when failures are imperfectly correlated and transactions costs are small.
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Observe that the tax is a general revenue tax. It is not ﬁnanced by
 direct deposit insurance premium which would inﬂuence agents’
ctions and allow for more control. This makes the analysis easier,
et it is also more realistic to the extent that existing funded bank
nsurance pools in EU countries were, and still are, woefully inade-
uate to handle systemic crises.10 An implication is that domestic
itizens carry the entire expected cost of providing deposit insur-
nce, which includes any foreign depositors that deposit in the
ome bank.
. Equilibria given full foreign deposit insurance
In this section we solve the basic model recursively assuming
hat the foreign country has committed to full deposit insurance
* = 1 in Stage 1.
.1. Stage 2: Banking subgame given deposit insurance levels
In this subgame d* = 1 and d ≥ (r/R) are given. A Nash equilib-
ium in the banking subgame, involves all depositors optimizing
iven the behaviour of other depositors. In our basic model, the
roportion B* foreign, and B domestic bound depositors trivially
eposit domestically. Thus, we need to consider only foreign loose
epositors and home loose depositors.
The 1 − B* foreign loose depositors either invest domestically
r in the home country. Their gross return (before taxes) from
nvesting domestically is (1 − P(D*))R* + P(D*)d*R* = R* = R, as we
ave assumed R* = R. Thus, foreign loose depositors have a dom-
nant strategy to deposit domestically rather than in the home
ountry and
∗L = max
{
R, (1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR − ε∗
}
− T∗ = R − T∗
Now consider home loose depositors. Their net return from
nvesting in the foreign country is R − ε − T, and investing abroad
ominates investing domestically when
L = max
{
(1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR, R−ε
}
− T = R − ε − T
hich implies ε < P(D)R(1 − d). This equation indicates that the
ome loose deposit in the foreign country when the transactions
ost of doing so, ε, is less than the net beneﬁts from doing so; i.e.,
he probability P(D) of failure domestically times the difference in
he returns on deposits held abroad and domestically in case of
ailure, R − dR.  Observe that the net beneﬁt of investing abroad is
argest when home deposit insurance is ineffective, d = r/R.
The interesting case is when the transaction cost ε is sufﬁciently
mall that the home loose choose to deposit in a foreign bank
where d* = 1) when home deposit insurance is ineffective:10 European Commission (2008a) found that none of the funded insurance pools
n EU countries, if any, came even close to covering losses for their “high-impact”
cenario in which banks defaulted on 3.24% of deposits. On average the pools had
nly  1/16 of the amount of funds needed. Europe is not unique in this respect. Inad-
quacy of pool funds, arguably forced government rescue measures that provided a
afety-net during the ﬁnancial crisis. These measures bypassed the funded pools as
xplained in Section 5. In this sense, our model deals with government policy rather
han regulators who  may  not have access to tax funds.
534 M.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 9 (2013) 530– 544
Table 1
Nash Equilibria for d and d* = 1
Interval Equilibria Expected Utility Welfare
[ rR , dp) HLL
UBHLL = (1 − b)R + bdR − THLL
ULHLL = R − ε − THLL
WHLL = W¯HLL − bBc(dR − r)
B L
HLL
B
DB = 
1 − p)
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c[dp , db)
HLL and
DB
UHLL, U
UDB = U
[db, 1] DB UDB = (
Investing domestically (weakly) dominates investing abroad
hen ε ≥ P(D)R(1 − d). Expressing this inequality in terms of d, the
ome loose deposit at home if and only if
 ≥ dP(D) ≡ 1 −
ε
P(D)R
(2)
he restriction 0 < ε < ε¯ implies that the threshold involves effec-
ive deposit insurance, dP(D) > (r/R). The individual decision whether
o deposit at home described in Eq. (2) depends on D, and hence on
he decisions of the other depositors as detailed in the following
roposition.
roposition 1. Given policies d and d* = 1, Nash equilibrium deposit
ehaviour is as follows:
(i) Home Loose Leave (HLL) Equilibrium. An equilibrium exists in
which the home loose depositors invest abroad and other depos-
itors invest domestically, D = B and D* = 2 − B, if and only if the
deposit insurance rate is sufﬁciently low d ∈ [(r/R), db), where
db ≡ 1 − (ε/bR).
ii) Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium. An equilibrium exists in which
all depositors invest domestically, D = 1 and D* = 1, if and only if
the deposit insurance rate is sufﬁciently high d ∈ [dp, 1],  where
dp ≡ 1 − (ε/pR).
roof. If all home loose invest in foreign deposits then D = B
nd D* = 2 − B. Hence P(D) = P(B) = b and by Eq. (2) depositing in
he foreign country is optimal when d < db = 1 − (ε/bR). This is the
LL Equilibrium. Conversely, if all the home loose invest in home
eposits, then D = 1 and D* = 1, and P(D) = P(1) = p. By Eq. (2) the
ome loose are optimizing when d ≥ dp. This is the DB Equilibrium.
Table 1 arranges these equilibria into intervals using the fact that
r/R) < dp < db < 1. If d < dp, then the HLL Equilibrium is unique. At the
ther end of the range, d ≥ db, the DB Equilibrium is unique. In the
ntermediate interval, d ∈ [dp, db),the equilibria coexist. The range of
his interval, db − dp = (ε/bR)((b/p) − 1), increases in the stress ratio
/p and the transaction cost ε. As ε decreases the range over which
he HLL Equilibrium is unique increases and ε → 0 implies dp → 1.
In Table 1 expected utility and welfare are net of taxes. In
he DB Equilibrium the tax is TDB = p(1 + c)(dR − r) > 0, and both
he bound and the loose have the same expected utility UDB =
B
DB = ULDB. In contrast, in the HLL Equilibrium the loose enjoy a
reater expected utility than the bound, ULHLL > U
B
HLL. The tax is
HLL = Bb(1 + c)(dR − r) ≥ 0. When deposit insurance is ineffective,
he tax is zero and welfare WHLL is at its maximum:
¯ HLL = (1 − b)R + br + (1 − B)[b(R − r) − ε]
ere W¯HLL is expressed as the expected return on deposits invested
t home plus the beneﬁt from the home loose accessing foreign
eposit insurance.
Here multiple equilibria arise when there is the possibility of
 self-fulﬁlling panic. For example, as d → db the DB Equilibrium
ields the loose higher utility, ULDB > U
L
HLL. Nevertheless, the HLL
quilibrium exists, because loose agents calculate they are better
ff depositing abroad when they believe enough other loose agents
e
u
r
dULDB
WHLL
WDB
R + pdR − TDB WDB = UDB
re depositing abroad. Hence, they all panic and deposit abroad.
he self-defeating nature of such equilibria is well understood in
he banking literature (see Section 3.3) and is not our focus.
In the rest of the paper, we  simplify the analysis by allowing
itizens of a country to coordinate among themselves. Coordina-
ion among citizens eliminates equilibria where citizens engage
n self-defeating panics based on extrinsic beliefs. Citizens use
nly information about fundamentals that are common knowledge.
ecause citizens focus on fundamentals, Allen and Gale (1998) pro-
ote this reﬁnement as an essentialequilibrium. In our model, it
llows the home loose to coordinate on the unique equilibrium
hat maximizes their utility as detailed below.
roposition 2. Given policies d and d* = 1, the essential banking
quilibrium is:
(i) Home Loose Leave (HLL) Equilibrium if and only if d ∈ [(r/R), d˜);
ii) Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium if and only if d ∈ [d˜, 1],
where d˜ = max{dp, min{d, db}} and d ≡ (r/R) + (ε¯ −
ε)/(R[bB + (bB − p)c]) equates ULHLL = ULDB.
The level of d˜ depends on taxes or, equivalently, the stress ratio
b/p as follows: d˜ = dp if and only if (b/p) ≥ (1/B), and d˜ > dp if and
only if (b/p) < (1/B) where d˜ < db is decreasing in b/p.
roof. We  can verify that (b/p) ≥ (1/B) if and only if d ≤ dp,
mplying d˜ = dp. Conversely, if (b/p) < (1/B), then d > dp and d˜ =
in{d, db}. In this later case d increases continuously over the
nterval with a decrease in b or an increase in p. 
This proposition reveals the importance of the stress ratio
r, equivalently, taxes as (b/p) ≥ (1/B) if and only if TDB ≤ THLL.
axes play a decisive role in the essential equilibrium because
ome loose depositors internalize the cost of the taxes they pay
owards funding domestic deposit insurance. For stress ratios high
nough, (b/p) ≥ (1/B), the taxes the home loose pay are higher in the
LL Equilibrium, even though their own  deposits would be cov-
red by foreign insurance. Thus, they deposit domestically when
b/p) ≥ (1/B). This yields d˜ at the lower bound dp. Since dp is the
ower bound on the DB (Nash) Equilibrium in Proposition 1, we
ave the following result.
orollary 3. If a Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium exists, then it
s the essential equilibrium whenever the stress ratio is high enough
b/p) ≥ (1/B).
.2. Stage 1: The home government’s choice of d given d* = 1
The home government chooses d to maximize welfare while
nticipating the banking equilibria in Stage 2. In particular,
onsider the government’s choice of d to achieve an essential
quilibrium according to Proposition 2. The government can
niquely choose a DB Equilibrium over the range d ≥ d˜. Over this
ange, d = d˜ maximizes welfare WDB(d˜) because it minimizes the
eadweight loss from taxation. The government can also choose
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Marking-to-market losses would force the devaluation of unsold
assets requiring further adjustment of balance sheets. Third, the
resulting decline in liquidity, bank loans and investment would
result in lower aggregate demand and a more susceptible banking
11 Alternatively, Morris and Shin (2000) show that a global games approach may
uniquely determine the equilibrium. They add a noisy signal about risky asset
returns to the Diamond and Dybvig model. If agents use “higher order beliefs” then
there exists a critical threshold beyond which there is a unique bank run equilib-
rium. However, multiplicity of equilibria still occurs in global games when prices
act as an endogenous public signal and private information is sufﬁciently preciseM.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
 HLL Equilibrium by setting d < d˜. Over this range, ineffective
eposit insurance d = r/R maximizes welfare at W¯HLL.
The government’s problem therefore reduces to a binary choice.
he DB Equilibrium is chosen if and only if WDB(d˜) ≥ W¯HLL, or equiv-
lently, the transaction cost ε satisﬁes:
B[((1 + c)/B) − (b/p)]ε¯ − cp(1 − d˜)R
1 − B ≤ ε < ε¯ (3)
 “high” stress ratio, (b/p) ≥ ((1 + c)/B), is sufﬁcient for the left-hand
ide of this equation to be nonpositive. Here the damage from the
oose leaving is so high that the DB Equilibrium with full insurance
s preferable to the HLL Equilibrium without insurance: WDB(1) ≥
¯ HLL. The following proposition describes the home government’s
ptimal choice of d.
roposition 4. Assume d* = 1 and the bank subgame is determined
y the essential banking equilibrium. The choice of d depends on the
tress ratio as follows.
 High stress ratio (b/p) ≥ ((1 + c)/B). The home government chooses
d = dp to realize the Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium.
 Medium stress ratio (1/B) ≤ (b/p) < ((1 + c)/B). The home government
chooses d = dp to realize the DB Equilibrium when either the stress
ratio is near the upper bound ((1 + c)/B), the deadweight loss c > 0 is
sufﬁciently small, or the transaction cost ε < ε¯ is sufﬁciently high;
otherwise, it chooses d = r/R to realize the Home Loose Leave (HLL)
Equilibrium.
 Low stress ratio (b/p) < (1/B). The home government chooses d =
d˜ > dp to realize the DB Equilibrium when ε < ε¯ is sufﬁciently high;
otherwise it chooses d = r/R to realize the HLL Equilibrium. Holding
ε constant, the HLL Equilibrium obtains when the stress ratio is near
the lower bound (b/p) → (1/B) or c ≥ 0 is sufﬁciently large.
roof. If (b/p) ≥ ((1 + c)/B) then we can also observe directly
hat (3) is satisﬁed and the DB Equilibrium obtains. For medium
tress ratios, (1/B) ≤ (b/p) < ((1 + c)/B), Proposition 2 requires d˜ = dp
nd the numerator in (3) becomes B[((1 + c)/B) − (b/p)]ε¯ − cε =
[(1/B) − (b/p)]ε¯ + c(ε¯ − ε). This expression is nonpositive when
pproaching the upper bound, (b/p) → ((1 + c)/B), or when c > 0
s small enough. In both cases, (3) is satisﬁed. Conversely, for
b/p) → (1/B), ε → 0 and c sufﬁciently large (3) is violated and
he HLL Equilibrium obtains. For low stress ratios, (b/p) < (1/B),
roposition 2 requires d˜ > dp. If ε → ε¯,  the numerator reduces to
[(1/B) − (b/p)]ε¯ so (3) is satisﬁed. The numerator also reduces to
[(1/B) − (b/p)]ε¯ when c = 0. Then (3) can be satisﬁed with ε small
hen (b/p) → (1/B). The numerator is bounded below when eval-
ated at d˜ → dp yielding B[(1/B)  − (b/p)]ε¯ + c(ε¯ − ε) > 0 for any
 ≥ 0. Thus, ε sufﬁciently small, c sufﬁciently large, or (b/p) → 1
iolate (3). 
Medium and low stress ratios lie below ((1 + c)/B). Over this
ange a relatively large c favours the HLL Equilibrium because
he cost of funding deposit insurance is otherwise large. Here,
he government prefers not to compete for deposits and lets the
ome loose deposit abroad. Intuitively, home welfare is maxi-
ized by “free riding” on foreign deposit insurance. Interestingly,
roposition 4 implies that free riding on foreign deposit insurance
ay  be the best policy even when c = 0. This happens with low
tress ratios, which indicate little damage is done to the stability of
he home banking system if the home loose leave.
Proposition 4 reveals that the home government only provides
ffective deposit insurance when it chooses the DB Equilibrium, in
hich case d = d˜ ≥ 1 − (ε/pR). Since d → 1 as ε → 0 the home gov-
rnment would respond with near full deposit insurance when the
ransaction cost ε is “small” and that the stress ratio is sufﬁciently
(
c
l
d
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arge that the DB Equilibrium obtains. Then competing for deposits
y almost matching deposit insurance is optimal. Not competing,
y instead providing ineffective deposit insurance, would result
n a high probability of banking failure which hurts home bound
epositors and reduces home country welfare.
.3. Discussion and extensions
At this point it is useful to compare our analysis with clas-
ic banking models. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) asset returns
re certain but multiple equilibria exist, including an inefﬁcient
ank run equilibrium that occurs when depositors coordinate on
n extrinsically uncertain “sunspot”. Allen and Gale (1998) extend
iamond and Dybvig’s model to include risky asset returns and ﬁnd
 bank run equilibrium in which agents coordinate on asset returns
nstead of a sunspot. Gorton (1988) provides empirical evidence of
ank runs that are related to real returns over the business cycle.
ike Allen and Gale, we concentrate on risky asset returns gener-
ting risky banks and use their essential equilibrium reﬁnement
o eliminate equilibria in which citizens engage in a self-defeating
ank runs.11
In Allen and Gale (1998) the probability of asset failure is
xogenous. We link the probability of asset and bank failure, P(D),
nversely to the level of deposits D. As retaining deposits stabilizes
he domestic banking system, the domestic government has an
ncentive to raise deposit insurance in order to help domestic banks.
he next section develops the general game between countries.
eposit insurance levels are a positive outcome of this game rather
han a normative prescription within a country. However, because
e assume there are costs to providing deposit insurance, its pro-
ision is not inevitable. Proposition 4 reveals the circumstance in
hich the home government chooses not to compete and lets loose
gents deposit abroad. This is analogous to Allen and Gale’s result
hat bank runs generated by fundamentals are sometimes efﬁcient.
Our static model does not provide a microfoundation for P(D),
hich captures the link between systemic risk and aggregate
eposits. Modelling systemic risk would involve a dynamic model
hich has frictions and general equilibrium pricing. Intuitively,
uppose that the home and foreign banking sectors have in the
ecent past attracted D = D* = 1 in deposits and invested these funds
ccordingly. A reduction of deposits could arise from either short-
erm deposits not being renewed or the withdrawal of existing
eposits. If the reduction was large it would necessitate the large
iquidation of assets (in the absence of offsetting central bank inter-
ention). This would increase bank failures for a number of possible
easons. First, banks may  be forced to sell or write down illiquid
ssets at a large discount (“a ﬁre sale”). Second, even usually liquid
ssets might be heavily discounted in a systemic banking crisis.e.g.  Angeletos and Werning, 2006). The global games approach does not work with
ommon knowledge, which we  assume in our simpler analysis. Common knowledge
eads to informationally efﬁcient markets based on fundamentals and makes coor-
ination among depositors based on fundamentals straightforward. Policymakers
an observe the fundamentals and respond appropriately.
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ystem.12 Finally, longer term, a smaller banking system might lose
cale economies and become more susceptible.13 We  have kept the
anking subgame as simple as possible in order to keep the deposit
nsurance game tractable.
.3.1. Deposits and failure
In our model deposits affect the probability of failure, but not
he failure return r. The degree to which capital ﬂight reduces the
ailure return could be roughly captured by assuming the return
(D) increases in D. Extending the model in this way gives similar
esults. The Nash equilibria are unaffected if the level of deposit
nsurance is sufﬁciently high, d ≥ (r(1)/R) when setting r(1) = r and
* = r. Now, however, the Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium is the
ssential equilibrium over a larger range. This is because loose
epositors internalize the expected extra taxes they pay from
anking abroad when r(B) < r(1) = r. At the same time, the govern-
ent has a greater incentive to support the DB Equilibrium as
t lowers the expected cost of providing deposit insurance. Thus,
he government provides the minimum deposit insurance to real-
ze the DB Equilibrium at a lower stress ratio threshold than in
roposition 4.
.3.2. Bankruptcy costs
When deposits are demandable, bankruptcy is triggered if a
ank is unable to meet its contractual ﬁxed payment to deposi-
ors. Bankruptcy would occur in the failure state with any ﬁxed
ayment greater than r. (Pooling of individual bank returns can-
ot be used to raise average returns above r as systemic risk in
ur model corresponds to domestic banks failing together.) Then
he payment in the failure state would be r less bankruptcy costs.
ith competitive banking the ﬁxed payment would be R, as in our
odel. Depositors are paid out in full in case of success and will
eceive the residual in case of failure.14 The results are the same
s in our model except that r is replaced by r net of bankruptcy
osts.
Of course, depositor contracts with a contractual ﬁxed payment
ould not be optimal under our risk neutral assumption. The
ptimal contract would be state-contingent and hence avoid
ankruptcy costs. Depositors would be promised a payment of R
n case of success and r with failure. Equilibrium payments would
e the same as in our model.
12 In Diamond and Rajan (2005) a market for liquid funds links banks together in
 general equilibrium. The uncertain timing of bank asset returns can cause bank
ailures reducing aggregate liquidity and, in turn, undermine other banks leading
o  a meltdown of the banking system and economy. Here a real shock generates
ystemic risk to the banking system without need for interbank portfolio linkages.
attiston et al. (2012) review the theoretical literature on banks and systematic risk.
hey show that the diversiﬁcation of credit risk across more borrowers may increase
ystemic risk when there is the possibility of runs among lenders. End and Tabbae
2012) provide empirical measures for determining when liquidity risk generated
ystematic risk for Dutch banks.
13 Such economies of scale external to individual banks may  arise from economies
o  better quality inputs, such as well-trained banking staff, or from synergies from
aving larger networks of banks. A bigger banking system may  be better able to
iversify asset risks, vet troubled banks, or provide interbank liquidity. Further, as
he  banking system is the conduit for saving to investment, there may  be economies
o  scale from the better selection of domestic investment in which domestic banks
ay  have a native advantage over foreign banks.
14 With this contract, pooling assets among banks cannot achieve an average return
f  R for any imperfect correlation of individual bank returns (Recall our earlier
escription of a banking sector containing a large number of banks, each with asset
eturns r with probability P and R with probability 1 − P, where the realizations of
eturns may  be imperfectly correlated). Thus the banking system is very fragile to
 systematic shock. This contract might be also considered a legacy of the “great
oderation” period prior to the crisis where systemic risk was  perhaps viewed as
eglible and innovations in pooling were used to reduce idiosycratic bank risk.
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.3.3. Storage
Many models of banking include an alternative asset available
o all agents called “storage”, where 1 unit invested yields 1 with
ertainty at the end the period. With storage there is the possibil-
ty that agents abandon the home banking system, D = 0. It seems
easonable to assume that with zero deposits the bank system fails
ith certainty, P(0) = 1. Also assume that for home loose agents
anking abroad (with full insurance) is more appealing than stor-
ge, i.e. R − ε > 1.
A sufﬁcient condition for the policy equilibrium being unaf-
ected by storage is br + (1 − b)R ≥ 1. Here home bound agents do
etter than storage when deposit insurance is ineffective even
f the loose deposit abroad. The policy equilibrium is unaffected
ecause bound agents are made no worse off relative to this
enchmark and loose agents do at least as well as bound agents.
y contrast, there will be no policy equilibrium involving home
anking if pr + (1 − p)R ≤ 1. Then with ineffective deposit insur-
nce the loose leave and the home bound are better off in storage
s br + (1 − b)R < pr + (1 − p)R ≤ 1. The home government would not
ave their banking system with effective deposit insurance, because
 “bank run” into storage is more efﬁcient. Below we  narrow the
nquiry to home banking being productive under domestic bank-
ng, i.e. pr + (1 − p)R > 1, but unproductive if the home loose leave,
.e. br + (1 − b)R < 1.
The Nash equilibria of the banking subgame are unaffected
hen domestic agents do better by depositing in the home bank
han storage, dR ≥ 1. Conversely, if dR < 1 there is a Nash equilib-
ium where agents abandon the home banking system, D = 0, and
anking system fails P(0) = 1. In this “No Home Banking” (NHB)
quilibrium, no deposit insurance is provided and no taxes are
aid. Welfare is WNHB = BUBNHB + (1 − B)ULNHB > 1, where UBNHB = 1
nd ULNHB = R − ε > 1. The home government can choose the NHB
quilibrium by setting d = r/R, as the loose deposit abroad and the
ound are best off in storage. It can be shown that WNHB > WHLL
hen br + (1 − b)R < 1.15 Thus, the government’s problem reduces to
ither choosing d = r/R to achieve WNHB = (1 − B)(R − ε) + B, or d = d˜
o achieve WDB(d) = (1 − p)R + pR − cp(dR − r). Domestic banking is
referable when it is highly productive (i.e. (1 − p)R + pR is close to
 − ε, while cp is small) or when most citizens are home bound (i.e.
 is close to 1).
. The general analysis
This section examines the choice of home and foreign deposit
nsurance levels.
.1. Stage 2: Banking subgame equilibrium
In this subgame the policy pair (d*, d) is given. First consider
ome loose depositors. They choose to deposit domestically rather
han deposit in the foreign country if and only if
1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR ≥ (1 − P∗(D∗))R + P∗(D∗)d∗R − ε or
15 In reality, a banking system failure would badly disrupt the payments system
nd local loan relationships. It would also likely reduce employment and domes-
ic  ﬁnancial expertise. External beneﬁts of having a home banking system could be
rudely modelled by adding to welfare a positive term X(D) which is initially increas-
ng  in D. If X(B) is large, the government will choose effective deposit insurance so
hat the bound choose to deposit in the essential equilibrium; i.e. bdR + (1 − b)R ≥ 1
mplying d ≥ 1 − (R − 1)/bR > (r/R). If X(D) continues to increase in D > B, then the gov-
rnment has an extra incentive to compete for loose depositors and attain the DB
quilibrium.
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Fig. 1. Symmetry between the home and foreign banking sectors.
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 ≥ 1 − ε
P(D)R
− P
∗(D∗)
P(D)
(1 − d∗) (4)
imilarly, foreign loose depositors deposit in the foreign country if
nd only if:
1 − P(D))R + P(D)dR − ε∗ ≤ (1 − P∗(D∗))R + P∗(D∗)d∗R or
 ≤ 1 + ε
∗
P(D)R
− P
∗(D∗)
P(D)
(1 − d∗) (5)
n the special case d* = 1, Eq. (5) is satisﬁed and Eq. (4) simpliﬁes to
q. (2).
There are now three possible banking equilibria. As before there
s the possibility of a Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium where
 = D* = 1. Substituting P(1) = p and P*(1) = p* into the above condi-
ions implies that a DB Equilibrium exists for policy pair (d*, d) if
nd only if
≥1 − ε
pR
− p
∗
p
(1 − d∗) ≡ dDB(d∗) and (6)
 ≤ 1 + ε
∗
pR
− p
∗
p
(1 − d∗) ≡ d¯DB(d∗), (7)
hat is dDB(d
∗) ≤ d ≤ d¯DB(d∗). Observe that dDB(d∗) < 1, dDB(d∗) <
¯ DB(d∗)and that these terms are increasing in d*.The DB Equilib-
ium exists provided that d and d* are large enough relative to each
ther. In particular, d* must be large enough that d¯DB(d∗) ≥ (r/R).
therwise, foreign loose agents are better off depositing in the
ome country and the DB Equilibrium does not exist. However,
his possibility only arises when the ratio p*/p is much larger than
.
Now consider a Home Loose Leave (HLL) Equilibrium, where
 = B and D* = 2 − B. It exists when Eq. (4) is not satisﬁed, while Eq.
5) is satisﬁed; that is, if and only if
 < 1 − ε
bR
− g
∗
b
(1 − d∗) ≡ d¯HLL(d∗) (8)
inally, in the general model, there is a potential new equilibrium,
hich we term the Foreign Loose Leave (FLL) Equilibrium. In the
LL Equilibrium both the foreign and home loose agents prefer to
eposit in the home country: D = 2 − B* and D* = B*. This equilibrium
xists if Eq. (4) is satisﬁed, while (5) is not satisﬁed; that is, if and
nly if
 > 1 + ε
∗
gR
− b
∗
g
(1 − d∗) ≡ dFLL(d∗) (9)
The above analysis is summarized in the following generaliza-
ion of Proposition 1.
roposition 5. Given policies (d*, d), Nash equilibrium deposit
ehaviour is as follows:
(i) Domestic Banking (DB) Equilibrium exists if and only if dDB(d
∗) ≤
d ≤ d¯DB(d∗).
(ii) Home Loose Leave (HLL) Equilibrium. A banking equilibrium exists
in which the home loose depositors invest abroad and other
depositors invest domestically, D = B and D* = 2 − B, if and only
if d < d¯HLL(d∗)
iii) Foreign Loose Leave (FLL) Equilibrium. A banking equilibrium
exists in which the foreign loose depositors invest abroad and
other depositors invest domestically, D = 2 − B* and D* = B*, if and
only if d > dFLL(d
∗).
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the equilibria in the policy space (d*, d). In
ach ﬁgure the origin corresponds to ineffective deposit insurance,
(
a
aForeign deposit insurance, d*
Fig. 2. Foreign banking sector is riskier than the home banking sector.
d*, d) = (r/R, r/R). Policies that correspond to the HLL Equilibrium lie
elow the (brown) d¯HLL(d∗) line. Policies that correspond to the FLL
quilibrium lie above the (green) dFLL(d
∗) line. Policies that corre-
pond to the DB Equilibrium are located on and between the (red)
DB(d
∗) line and the (yellow) d¯DB(d∗) line. These regions overlap so
hat there are multiple Nash equilibria. For example, the DB Equi-
ibrium is unique only in the region in the upper right hand corner
here both d* and d are close to 1.
As before we use the essential equilibrium reﬁnement. Extend-
ng the reﬁnement to the general case involves allowing the foreign
oose citizens to coordinate among themselves. Now we have two
roups, home loose depositors and foreign loose depositors, play-
ng non-cooperatively. As a consequence, the reﬁnement does not
ield a unique essential equilibrium in the region of the parameter
pace where only the HLL and FLL equilibria coexist.
However, the essential equilibrium is unique in the corridor
f the parameter space where a DB Equilibrium exists provided
hat the stress ratios are large, (b/p) ≥ (1/B) and (b*/p*) ≥ (1/B*). A
LL Equilibrium cannot be an essential equilibrium because home
oose depositors as a group are better off depositing domestically
or any d* ≤ 1 by Corollary 3. Conversely, the FLL Equilibrium can-
ot be an essential equilibrium because foreign loose depositors as
 group are better off depositing domestically. For all policy combi-
ations (d*, d) for which the DB Equilibrium exists, it prevails as the
ssential equilibrium. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
roposition 6. If a Domestic Banking Equilibrium exists for polices
*d , d), then it is the essential equilibrium whenever the stress ratios
re in the medium or high range, (b/p) ≥ (1/B) and (b*/p*) ≥ (1/B*).
Thus any policies (d*, d) on or in the corridor formed by dDB(d
∗)
nd d¯DB(d∗) yield the DB Equilibrium as the essential equilibrium. In
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ig. 1, this ‘essential DB Equilibrium corridor’ contains the origin (d*,
) = (r/R, r/R). This situation occurs when there is relative symmetry
etween countries. We  now turn to show that if (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R)
s in the essential DB Equilibrium corridor, then this policy pair is
he unique policy equilibrium and it is efﬁcient.
.2. Policy equilibrium and efﬁciency
Now consider the policy game in which the foreign and home
overnments simultaneously choose their respective levels of
eposit insurance, d* and d, while anticipating the equilibria in the
anking subgame above. Each government chooses their insurance
evel to maximize their own country’s welfare taking the choice of
he other government as given. A non-cooperative Nash equilib-
ium to the policy game may  or may  not exist. If it exists, it may  or
ay not be efﬁcient. The analysis that follows is more technical and
he proofs are in the Appendix. We  focus the analysis by assuming
he following in the remainder of this section:
(i) c > 0 and c* > 0, i.e. the marginal deadweight loss is positive;
(ii) p = g and p* = g*, i.e. the home and foreign banking systems have
reached economies of scale after D = 1 and D* = 1, respectively;
iii) (b/p) ≥ (1/B) and (b*/p*) ≥ (1/B*), i.e. the stress ratios are in the
medium to high range; and
iv) citizens coordinate on essential equilibria in the banking sub-
game.
Under (i)–(iii) it can be shown that domestic banking (weakly)
elfare dominates other arrangements (independently of the
xistence of equilibria):
WDB(d) ≥ max[WHLL(d∗, d), WFLL(d)] and W∗DB(d∗)
≥ max[W∗HLL(d∗), W∗FLL(d∗, d)],
here the subscripts indicate the banking arrangement (e.g.
∗
FLL(d
∗, d) is foreign country welfare with foreign loose agents
epositing in the home country). For a given d, domestic banking
ives higher home welfare than other banking arrangements (inde-
endently of d*). Similarly, for a given d*, domestic banking gives
igher foreign welfare (independently of d). When deposit insur-
nce is costly to provide, c > 0 and c* > 0, there is a unique efﬁcient
utcome.
roposition 7. Domestic banking combined with ineffective deposit
nsurance,  (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R), maximizes individual country welfare
nd uniquely maximizes world welfare.
This arrangement is efﬁcient for three reasons. First, it avoids
he deadweight loss from providing effective deposit insurance.
econd, it avoids the transactions costs that incurred with moving
eposits abroad. Third, domestic banking manages to minimize the
robability of systemic risk in both countries simultaneously.
We now determine when a policy equilibrium exists and
hether it is efﬁcient. The following proposition shows that when
he countries’ banking systems are somewhat similar, a policy equi-
ibrium exists that achieves the efﬁcient outcome. As we  argue
ater, this equilibrium describes the European situation before the
008 banking crisis.
roposition 8. Suppose the home and foreign banking systems
ace a somewhat similar risk of bank failure under domestic banking,
* − p ∈ [− ε/(R − r), ε*/(R − r)]. Then ineffective deposit insurance at
*ome and abroad,  (d , d) = (r/R, r/R), is the unique policy equilibrium.
t implies the Domestic Banking Equilibrium and efﬁciency.
This case is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the origin (r/R, r/R) is
n the essential DB Equilibrium corridor. The Appendix proves that
c
(
mcial Stability 9 (2013) 530– 544
ny policies (d*, d) outside the corridor would not be chosen, as one
ountry could increase its welfare by reducing its insurance rate to
ocate in the corridor. However, policies in the corridor with effec-
ive insurance would not be chosen either, as at least one country
ould increase its welfare by reducing its insurance rate while stay-
ng in the corridor. Only when deposit insurance is ineffective for
oth countries will there be a policy equilibrium.
But what happens if the countries are not ‘somewhat similar’?
he home banking sector might be substantially riskier than the
oreign sector or substantially less risky. We  shall focus, without
oss of generality, on the latter case, i.e. p* − p > ε*/(R − r). This case is
epicted in Fig. 2, where the origin (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R) lies to the left of
he essential DB Equilibrium corridor. There are two subcases. First,
 − p* < ε/(R − r); here the home banking system is always less risky
han the foreign system, independent of the level of deposits. In
his case, d¯HLL(r/R) < (r/R), and it can be shown that an equilibrium
lways exists. Second, b − p* ≥ ε/(R − r); here the home banking sys-
em is less risky if the home loose agents do not leave (D ≥ 1) but
iskier if they do leave (D = B). This second case is more relevant to
ur policy discussion (e.g. where Germans deposit in Ireland) and,
herefore, is the focus of the analysis below. Graphically, this means
hat the d¯HLL(d∗) intercepts the vertical axis (i.e. d¯HLL(r/R) ≥ (r/R))
s in Fig. 2.
The policy pair (d, d*) = (r/R, r/R), which welfare dominates other
olicies, is now in a region with two essential equilibria, the FLL
quilibrium and the HLL Equilibrium. For simplicity we suppose
hat one of these essential equilibria is selected by a ‘sunspot’,
here depositors coordinate on the HLL Equilibrium with probabil-
ty q, and the FLL Equilibrium with probability 1 − q. The sunspot
robability q is independent of d* and d. This gives two  thresh-
lds for the sunspot probability that are used to separate the DB
quilibrium from the loose leave equilibria:
qDB ≡ 1 − [p
∗ − p − (ε∗/(R − r))][c + (1 + c)(1 − B)]
B∗(b∗ − p − (ε∗/(R − r))) − (p∗ − p − (ε∗/(R − r))) < 1 and
qLL ≡ (p/b)[b − p
∗ − (ε/(R − r))][c + (1 + c)(1 − B∗)]
B(b − p∗ − (ε/(R − r))) − (p − p∗ − (ε/(R − r))) ≥ 0
here qDB < 1 follows from the assumption b*/p* ≥ 1/B*. Depending
n parameters qLL < 1 or qLL ≥ 1. If qLL < 1, then a policy equilibrium
oes not exist for large q as detailed below.
roposition 9. Suppose that the home banking system is substan-
ially less risky than the foreign system under domestic banking,
* − p > (ε*/(R − r)), but is more risky when the home loose leave,
 − p* ≥ (ε/(R − r)). A policy equilibrium does not exist if qLL < 1 and
he sunspot probability is large, q > max  {qDB, qLL}. Otherwise, a unique
olicy equilibrium exists as follows:
(i) If q ≤ qDB, then the policy pair (d*, (r/R)) where
d* = 1 − (ε*/(p*R)) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)] > (r/R) is the policy equilib-
rium. The Domestic Banking Equilibrium obtains with certainty.
It is inefﬁcient.
ii) If q ∈ (qDB, qLL], then (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R). The Home Loose Leave
Equilibrium occurs with probability q and the Foreign Loose Leave
Equilibrium with probability 1 − q.
We use this result later on when examining the possibility that
he 2008 banking crisis affected EU countries asymmetrically.
. The European situationAs part of the European Union’s objective to integrate ﬁnan-
ial markets, the 1994 EU directive on deposit guarantee schemes
Directive 94/19/EC) required Member states to guarantee a
inimum of D 20,000 of each depositor’s aggregate deposits.
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emirgüc¸ -Kunt et al. (2008) document that most of the 27 EU
ountries had set their actual deposit insurance limits at or close
o the D 20,000 limit by the end of 2007. The two  exceptions in the
urozone were, notably, France (at D 70,000) and Italy (D 100,000).
Under the 1994 directive, branches of credit institutions that
re outside the home country are covered by the home country’s
eposit insurance scheme. And, the slightly earlier Second Banking
irective (89/646/EC) introduced the principle of “mutual recog-
ition” in banking. For example, a German bank can branch out
o offer banking services in France, say, without needing the per-
ission of the French bank regulator, and the French branches
f this German bank are covered by Germany’s deposit insurance
cheme(s). Thus, branches of foreign banks provide a ready vehicle
or soliciting foreign deposits. Foreign internet banks offer another
ossibility to migrate between deposit insurance schemes for EU
epositors, and some of them indeed target foreign depositors.
iven the popularity of e-commerce, many EU customers can cur-
ently move deposits swiftly between competing deposit insurance
chemes. However, the issue of competition through deposit insur-
nce schemes had already been recognized in the 1994 Directive
hat put limits on advertising using the applicable deposit insur-
nce scheme. Although deposit insurance information had to be
eadily available, governments had to ensure that banks were not
dvertising information that would distort competition (Directive
4/19/EC, Article 9(3)).
In our model banks can issue just a single type of liability,
amely deposits. The country with the highest level of deposit
nsurance has an advantage in attracting deposits. In reality gov-
rnments and regulators can defend their domestic banks using
 range of instruments. Laeven and Valencia (2010) assess which
ountries experienced a systemic banking crisis in 2007–2008 and
ive a comprehensive overview of measures supporting banking.
elow we review the developments in the EU concerning deposits
nsurance and other guarantees of bank liabilities.16
On September 30, in the midst of the credit crisis, the govern-
ent of Ireland announced that they would guarantee all retail
nd wholesale deposits at their largest 6 banks for two years. They
lso guaranteed covered bonds, senior debt and subordinated debt.
inancial Times (2008) reported that this new scheme guaranteed
n estimated E400bn of liabilities. Government of Ireland (2008)
tated that these moves were in response to “the impact of the
ecent international market turmoil on the Irish Banking system”,
nd felt that it would “remove any uncertainty on the part of coun-
erparties and customers of the six institutions”.
On October 3, the United Kingdom announced an increase in
heir deposit guarantee limit, from £ 35,000 to £ 50,000, effective
ctober 7. Reuters (2008) reported that the Irish guarantee caused
 ﬂood of cash from UK into the guaranteed Irish banks. According
he British Bankers and Association (2008), UK banks in Northern
reland were disadvantaged by Ireland’s guarantee.
On October 5, after publicly denouncing Ireland’s “beggar-
hy-neighbour” move earlier, the Chancellor of Germany, Angela
erkel, announced that the German government would fully guar-ntee the safety of the public’s deposits. Previous to this move,
ermany had guaranteed a minimum of D 20,000 of deposits. The
conomist (2008) reported that Germany’s move “may have been
16 In the EU national policy makers have arguably more opportunities to create
ocal competitive advantages through guarantees of liabilities than through liquid-
ty  support measures, asset purchases or bank nationalizations. Liquidity support
easures are essentially in the hands of the European Central Bank, a supranational
ody; asset purchases and bank nationalizations have been vetted quite strongly
y the European Commission in the context of the EU Treaty Articles on State Aid
see  e.g. European Commission, 2011). Panetta et al. (2009) also observes that asset
uarantees were less frequently used.
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rompted by large numbers of electronic withdrawals of deposits
t the weekend.”
On the same day, the Austrian Minister of Finance, Wilhelm
olterer, announced that Austria would follow Germany by guar-
nteeing deposits. At the time no ofﬁcial amount was  announced,
ut by October 8, the Austrian government approved an unlimited
uarantee for private customers (European Commission, 2008b).
ccording to Reuters (2008), Molterer said that this move was to
ensure Austrian savings are not withdrawn and transferred to
ermany”.
On October 6, the government of Denmark announced that
hey would guarantee all deposits in Danish banks for two years
Government of Denmark, 2008). The new Danish guarantee plan
s unique because it takes heed of possible competitive distort-
ons. Unlike other countries, the plan allows for branches of
oreign banks (located in Denmark) to participate. Previous to this
nnouncement Denmark had insured 300,000 Kroner, approxi-
ately D 40,000.
On October 7, at the EcoFin Council meeting in Luxembourg,
U ﬁnance ministers agreed to raise the Union wide deposit guar-
ntee minimum from D 20,000 to D 50,000 for an initial period
f at least one year. In order to prevent a situation from occurring
gain, the Council laid the framework for Directive 2009/14/EC, that
mended the 1994 Directive on deposit insurance in regards to the
ayout delay and the coverage level. Directive 2009/14/EC came
nto effect in March 2009. It speciﬁed a minimum guarantee of D
0,000 until 31 December 2010 and a common level of D 100,000
fterwards (European Union, 2009). Negotiations to overhaul this
009 Deposit Guarantee Directive were launched in 2010 and have
ot been concluded as of July 2013.
Panetta et al. (2009) review the government support meas-
res of the ﬁnancial sector in the 11 countries which “account
or the bulk of these interventions” in 2008–2009. They report
hat 6 EU countries announced liability guarantee programmes
etween 8 and 14 October 2008 (namely France, Germany, Italy,
he Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom). They also men-
ion that ﬁve of these EU countries established maximums for these
uarantees, which strongly suggests that tax payers carry part of
he cost of these guarantees. Bank of International Settlements
2011) reports that “By December 2010, more than 200 banks in 16
dvanced economies had issued close to D 1 trillion equivalent of
uaranteed bonds.” Levy and Zaghini (2010) show these bond guar-
ntees were credible and resulted in a drop of the funding costs of
anks. Hence, as in our model, tax payers pay at least part of the cost
or these guarantees. The pre-crisis study of European Commission
2008a) argues convincingly that even at pre-crisis levels of deposit
nsurance all of the EU’s deposit guarantee schemes were under-
unded and hence effectively subsidized by tax payers. In line with
ur model EU tax payers must have carried the lion’s share of the
ost associated with the deposit insurance increases in 2008.
The events reported above support our political economy model
f competition for deposits between EU member states. Refer-
nces that member states made regarding other deposit insurance
chemes appear not to be just political cheap talk. Rather, they
irectly lead to emergency efforts to stem the damage from non-
ooperation by collectively trying to harmonize policies. Such
oncerted efforts to harmonize EU deposit insurance schemes
ould have been irrelevant at best and misguided at worse if
nly independent forces had played a role in member states.17
17 The predictions of our model for actual deposit ﬂows are unclear. In our model,
olicy is based on anticipated ﬂows, and in equilibrium there are no ﬂows when
eposit insurance is successfully raised to prevent deposit ﬂows. Deposit ﬂows
re useful evidence according to a slightly different empirical interpretation of the
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ompetition for deposits between EU member states is also a
erious issue for the European Commission who, in its impact
ssessment accompanying its current legislative proposal to mod-
fy the 2009 Deposit Guarantee Directive, formulates the so-called
Problem Deﬁnition” as follows:
When the ﬁnancial crisis aggravated in autumn 2008, most
Member States either raised their coverage levels to D 50 000
or D 100 000 or issued unlimited guarantees, sometimes cov-
ering not only deposits but all liabilities of banks. . . . This
created heavy liquidity strains to the banks not covered by
such guarantees. . . . In order to avoid competitive disadvan-
tages and prevent the outﬂow of deposits, other Member
States were also forced to increase radically their coverage
. . . Those actions were undertaken unilaterally in an uncoor-
dinated way, and – as they were followed by other Member
States – contributed to serious competitive distortion between
Member States, undermining depositor conﬁdence and threat-
ening the overall stability of the EU ﬁnancial markets. [European
Commission (2010), p. 9]
. European deposit insurance and regulatory competition
This section attempts to understand the drastic changes in Euro-
ean deposit insurance using the logic of regulatory competition.
rom the above description, we know that prior to September
008 the bulk of bank deposits in EU countries were uninsured.
ost European countries were in the symmetric position of guar-
nteeing only the legal minimum deposit insurance, a meagre D
0,000. Arguably, it would have taken a very large drop in asset
alues before government funding would be needed to make good
he insurance. If so, the situation prior to September 2008 would
ave been close what we  term ineffective deposit insurance. In
ur model, lower levels of deposit insurance are collectively desir-
ble because deposit insurance involves a deadweight loss. In fact,
roposition 7 provides conditions under which ineffective deposit
nsurance maximizes individual country and world welfare. Fur-
her, Proposition 8 predicts ineffective deposit insurance as the
utcome of international competition when the banking systems
re somewhat symmetric. Here international competition achieves
he optimal outcome.
What changed during the crisis? Below we explore some pos-
ible explanations suggested by the model. Changes are examined
hat lead to policies that are described as either defensive responses
r beggar-thy-neighbour responses.
.1. Defensive responses to the ﬁnancial crisis
.1.1. Asymmetric changes in the risk of bank losses
Many banks become insolvent during the 2008 ﬁnancial cri-
is. Here we examine the consequences of Irish banks having a
igher risk of failure than German banks. In particular, suppose the
risis induced an unanticipated increase in the difference in the
ailure rates from p* − p ≤ (ε*/(R − r)), where Proposition 8 applies,
o p* − p > (ε*/(R − r)), where Proposition 9 applies. Then it is possi-
odel. If anticipations of deposit ﬂows by policy makers are based on incipient
ows, then a careful study of deposit ﬂows would provide useful empirical evidence.
eposit ﬂow data is unfortunately only available at the quarterly level. End-of-
uarter deposit data of the European Central Bank and the Bank of International
ettlements did reveal that aggregate deposits held at eurozone credit institutions
ere at quite stable levels throughout 2008. The Bank of International Settlements
ata suggests furthermore that deposit ﬂows between member states appear to
e  quite a bit more volatile than EU aggregate deposit levels (data available upon
equest).
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le that the Irish government would raise deposit insurance to an
ffective level, d* = 1 − (ε*/(p*R)) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)] > (r/R), in order
o safe-guard the stability of their banking sector.
Was  a move to d* = 1 conceivable according to the model?
lmost complete deposit insurance (d* → 1) would arise when
epositors at Irish banks move abroad easily (ε* → 0) and the Ger-
an  banking sector is viewed as very safe (p → 0). Below we  argue
hat it is unlikely that depositors viewed deposits in Germany as
erfectly safe in the midst of the crisis. Another problem for this
cenario is that Proposition 9 shows that the optimal response by
ermany would have been to keep deposit insurance ineffective,
hich, we  saw, Germany did not.
In order to support this scenario consider that policy makers
ay be uncertain about the level of the model parameters, for
xample regarding the levels of p and ε*.18 Under such uncertainty
ational policy makers could choose higher insurance levels than
n Proposition 9. This is because a policy error of raising deposit
nsurance to a level which is insufﬁciently high to prevent a crisis,
ould be very costly, while, at the same time, the extra cost of full
eposit insurance is relatively small when c is relatively small.
With uncertainty the situation may  have been the following.
he increase in p* − p combined with a possible spike in the Irish
tress level b*/p* could have spurred Ireland to “err on the safe side”
ith d* = 1. Facing d* = 1, Germany’s optimal response would be to
aise deposit insurance to d = dp = 1 − (ε/pR) to retain their loose
epositors. Interestingly, such a German response is welcomed by
he Irish since it reduces the expected cost of deposit insurance for
reland.
In this scenario, the Irish move to full deposit insurance is clearly
ot a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (whether or not they anticipated
 reaction by Germany). However, Germany was justiﬁably upset
y the Irish move to full deposit insurance as this presented the
ountry with a high expected deposit insurance liability and forced
 policy volte-face.
.1.2. German banks were also vulnerable
In the previous scenario Ireland was  hit hard during the crisis
hile Germany remained a safe haven. However, if Germany was a
afe haven then this was arguably only true in relative terms.19
ccording to Laeven and Valencia (2010), Germany and Ireland
ere both among the eight EU member states that experienced
 full-blown systemic banking crisis in 2008 (along with Austria,
elgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the UK).
Continue therefore to assume that the crisis impacted banks
n EU countries asymmetrically. However, now suppose that both
erman and Ireland banking sectors were vulnerable to losing
epositors to other EU countries. In this version of the model both
erman and Ireland would be conﬂated as the Foreign country,
nd Germany raised deposit insurance to stem a deposit outﬂow to
ther EU countries that depositors might deem safer. Further, Ger-
an  authorities could justify their policy volte-face by scapegoatingreland.
Consistent with the prediction of our model, the countries with
anking sectors that were deemed safer in 2008, notably Italy,
18 A lack of data makes it difﬁcult to determine what happened. At the time of
he  events, the key agents in our model also lacked data. It appears that in 2008 EU
egulators possessed deposit ﬂow data only for their own countries’ banks at the
onthly level at best (from our conversations with academics and a bank regulator
rom an EU nation). This suggests that their rushed actions were made in a context
ith considerable uncertainty.
19 The German banking sector was also in poor shape in the fall of 2008. For exam-
le,  Hypo Real Estate, the country’s then second largest ﬁnancial institution, was
everely distressed. On October 6 a D 50 Bln Hypo rescue package by the German
overnment and German banks was  adopted (Bloomberg 2008).
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deposit insurance in both countries. This is a prisoner’s dilemma as
both countries are better off with ineffective deposit insurance.
20 In a ﬁnancial crisis, one contender for a liquidity shock could be wholesale
depositors who in 2008 withdrew money from the interbank market. We  have
also learnt from the episode of the global ﬁnancial crisis that other possible con-
tenders could be collapses of other segments of the wholesale funding market, such
as,  for example, the commercial paper market (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). On
the  other hand, the European Central Bank countered with massive liquidity injec-
tions. Interestingly, Gatev and Strahan (2006) ﬁnd that the funding position of banks
improves with liquidity shocks in the commercial paper market, a phenomenon that
they attribute to the tendency of governments to protect the banking sector in timesM.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
oland, and to a lesser extent France did not increase deposit
nsurance, and provided less support to their banking sectors
han Ireland and Germany (see e.g. Laeven and Valencia, 2010).
ccording to the model, the move by Ireland and Germany actu-
lly beneﬁted such safer countries as it avoided a costly inﬂux of
eposits.
.2. Beggar-thy-neighbour responses to the ﬁnancial crisis
None of the above scenarios describe a “beggar-thy-neighbour”
otive for increasing deposit insurance. Insurance is increased to
etain domestic deposits. Attracting deposits from abroad is a costly
ide effect because it involves providing insurance to nonresidents.
nder Assumption 1(ii), where p = g and p* = g*, there are no stabil-
ty beneﬁts to increasing the scale of the banking system beyond
ervicing domestic depositors.
We can model a beggar-thy-neighbour situation by examining
he case p > g and p* > g*. Now increasing the scale of the home bank-
ng system by attracting foreign deposits improves its stability. The
eneﬁt to the home country is (p − g)(R − r), which is the expected
ain to all home depositors from the lower failure risk. This is a
eggar-thy-neighbour beneﬁt because it can be achieved only at
he expense of making the foreign banking system less stable.
When the beggar-thy-neighbour beneﬁts for both countries
re sufﬁciently small relative to the associated costs (of mov-
ng deposits and raising deposit insurance), the equilibria are
nchanged from Propositions 8 and 9. However, if the beneﬁt is
ufﬁciently great, then the countries may  face a prisoner’s dilemma
ith full deposit insurance as the outcome.
For a simple analysis, consider assumptions which give the most
ntense competition in the banking subgame. Assume transaction
osts are very small (ε → 0) and that loose depositors coordinate by
epositing in the country with the highest posted deposit insurance
ate (if both countries post the same rate, all deposits are domes-
ic). These assumptions are consistent with depositors maximizing
heir net rate of return in equilibrium (unless b < g* or b* < g). They
lso result in depositors switching countries to pursue marginally
igher deposit rates and governments choosing marginally higher
eposit rates in a race to full insurance.
In the Nash game between countries (Stage 1), each coun-
ry’s choices boil down to one of three possibilities. The home
ountry will either choose to: set an ineffective rate (d = r/R),
atch the foreign deposit insurance rate (d = d*), or just beat it
d = d* + ,  where  > 0 is very small). Just beating the foreign
ate attracts foreign deposits and earns the beggar-thy-neighbour
eneﬁt (p − g)(R − r) > 0. Consider the cost of this policy for
he home country. In the event of a banking failure, the
ome country incurs the deadweight loss from insuring domes-
ic depositors, c(dR − r), plus the costs of insuring the (1 − B)
epositors from abroad, (1 − B)(1 + c)(dR − r). Thus, the expected
ost is g[c + (1 − B)(1 + c)](dR − r). With full deposit insurance,
he beggar-thy-neighbour beneﬁt exceeds the total cost when
 < p/(1 + c)(2 − B). With a similar condition for the foreign coun-
ry, both countries have an incentive to just beat the other’s posted
ate in a race to full deposit insurance (see Engineer et al. (2012)
or further details).
Now consider possible changes that can lead to a beggar-thy-
eighbour situation.
.2.1. Changes in the risk of bank losses
Initial ineffective deposit insurance obtains when the beggar-
hy-neighbour beneﬁt is zero (p* = g*) or negligible. If the beneﬁt
attered in the crisis, then the difference p* − g* must have
ncreased. Even without a similar change in Germany, there would
o
t
e
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till be a race to full deposit insurance. In this race, Germany wants
o match the Irish rate rather than beat it.
In this asymmetric scenario, Germany is the victim of an Irish
eggar-thy-neighbour policy. The policy is unambiguously aggres-
ive if the change in p* was  still within the bounds described in
roposition 8. Those bounds describe the range of p* − p where
t is not necessary for Ireland to change from ineffective deposit
nsurance to protect itself from capital ﬂight. On the other hand,
f the change in p* was large enough to lie outside the bounds
n Proposition 9, then Ireland had to raise its deposit insur-
nce rate, at least somewhat, to prevent capital ﬂight. It might
ave “erred on the safe side” and mistakenly set the rate too
igh as described in Section 6.1. In either scenario, the Irish
ove to raise deposit insurance was self defeating and myopic
s Germany responded. Of course, if Germany was also shocked
ith an increase in p − g, then the situation is a prisoner’s dilemma
s described in the previous subsection. In a prisoner’s dilemma
etting neither country is myopic but both suffer from being
ncooperative.
The above analysis assumes that countries can instantly beneﬁt
rom a sudden large net inﬂow of deposits. An inﬂow of deposits
ight help assuage expectations in the very short run. However, it
uts banks in the difﬁcult situation of ﬁnding ways to invest extra
unds in a crisis. For this reason we provide a second beggar-thy-
eighbour scenario.
.2.2. Liquidity shocks
A beggar-thy-neighbour situation may  also be triggered by
eleveraging or a liquidity shock which reduces deposits available
o the banking system. Then there is a scarcity of overall deposits
nd, as we show with an example, attracting deposits from abroad
as a beneﬁt.
For simplicity, assume that parameters are symmetric across
ountries. Suppose that (1/2)(1 − B) loose depositors from each
ountry receive a liquidity shock and withdraw their deposits
rom the banking system for reasons that are unmodelled (for
nstance, they have preferential access to a safe asset or invest-
ent in a third country).20 Now let the probability of failure
hen both countries retain their domestic loose depositors be
(B + (1/2)(1 − B)) = l, where l ∈ (p, b).
In this setting, countries may  face a prisoner’s dilemma where
ull deposit insurance is the outcome.21 Choosing higher deposit
nsurance, when feasible, is a best response as it lures in the
1/2)(1 − B) depositors from abroad and achieves the lowest the
robability of failure, p. If there is already full deposit insurance
broad, the best response is to match it in order to retain domes-
ic loose deposits. This gives a probability of failure l, whereas not
atching a higher probability of failure b. The equilibrium has fullf crisis.
21 As analyzed above, a prisoner’s dilemma arises when the parmeters related to
he  beggar-thy-neighbour beneﬁt and stress ratio (here b − l and l − p) are large
nough and costs (low c and ε) are low enough. To ensure an equilibrium in pure
trategies, we need to use a reﬁnement, cost or impediment as described above.
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for the home country, WFLL(r/R) = WDB(r/R), it yields less welfare
for the foreign country, W∗FLL(r/R, r/R) < W
∗
DB(r/R). Thus, domestic
banking uniquely maximizes world welfare.42 M.H. Engineer et al. / Journal of
. Conclusion
In this paper deposit insurance is determined by competition
etween countries for international deposit ﬂows. Countries non-
ooperatively choose the level of deposit insurance. They assess
he costs of providing deposit insurance against the beneﬁt of pre-
enting capital ﬂight which could further destabilize the domestic
anking system. Our model completely abstracts from the standard
ormative rationales for deposit insurance: if countries are sym-
etric, both are best off without deposit insurance and achieve this
utcome in the absence of shocks. In the model, deposit insurance
s an inefﬁcient response to shocks or the presence of asymmetries.
s far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst paper to develop such a pos-
tive theory where both depositors and national governments are
ational actors.
In the model, depositors each maximize expected returns of
heir deposits and hence react to a cross-country difference in
he deposit insurance rate. We  start by examining the situa-
ion in which the government of a foreign country unexpectedly
nnounces an increase from a modest level of deposit insurance to
ull deposit insurance. This level of deposit insurance is attractive
o home footloose agents when home deposit insurance remains at
 modest level. The ﬂight of the footloose stresses the home bank-
ng system in the absence of a response by the home government.
e characterize when the home government rationally responds
ith full insurance.
A more difﬁcult task is to understand what triggers initial
hanges in deposit insurance policy. A key event in our analy-
is of the European banking crisis was Ireland’s sudden unilateral
doption of full deposit insurance. Our review of the history of
he crisis in Section 5 suggests a number of shocks in the model
hat rationalize a response of raising deposit insurance. In Section
, we categorize the responses into defensive responses, that
nintentionally affected other nations, and beggar-thy-neighbour
esponses. There are a number of scenarios even though we  have
isciplined the analysis by using a reﬁnement that eliminates self-
efeating panics by citizens. Depending on shocks, asymmetries
nd uncertainty, the motive for behaviour may  or may  not be iden-
iﬁed in the model. Examining the strengths and weaknesses of the
arious scenarios uncovers some of the complexity of the political
conomy.
In attempting to understand deposit insurance behaviour with
 political economy model that concentrates on fundamental asset
eturns, we do not deny that normative banking models also offer
nsights into the European banking crisis. For example, the seminal
odel of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggests quite a differ-
nt view. Rather than from uncertain asset returns, uncertainty
tems from extrinsic expectations (“sunspots”) which can coordi-
ate home depositors on a bank run equilibrium. Deposit insurance
liminates the self-defeating equilibrium. Thus, if all countries
ere hit with a common expectational shock, they might inde-
endently raise their levels of deposit insurance. In this alternative
iew the denouncement of other countries policies can only be
political) cheap talk. By contrast, our model suggests that the fric-
ion between governments was very real, and this interpretation
s supported by the considerable efforts of the EU to quickly har-
onize deposit insurance schemes following the crisis (European
ommission, 2010). The reality of the European banking crisis is
ikely best understood as complex interactions of expectational and
eal uncertainties. Self-defeating panic may  have played a role as
ell as deposit ﬂows responding to fundamentals.22
22 For example, Engineer et al. (2012) examine a scenario where depositors in
reland panicked from a change in extrinsic expectations but German depositors
o
g
m
e
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Overall, this paper demonstrates the value in modelling deposit
nsurance as a positive phenomenon. We  have concentrated on
he international political economy scenarios that arise from real
eturn risk. There remains much work to do to extend the analy-
is to include expectational uncertainty and richer bank contracts.
y highlighting the non-trivial interaction between national gov-
rnments, our basic model addresses some fundamental features
nderlying international banking in a world with ever more inte-
rated ﬁnancial markets.
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ppendix A. Proofs propositions of Section 4.2
.1. Proof of Proposition 7
First, we prove the welfare inequalities hold.
WHLL(d∗, d) = B{(1 − b)R + br} + (1 − B){(1 − p∗)R + p∗d∗R − ε}
− cbB(dR − r)
< B{(1 − b)R + br} + (1 − B)R − cbB(dR − r)
= (1 − bB)R + Bbr − cbB(dR − r)
 (1 − p)R + pr − cp(dR − r) = WDB(d)
nd similarly W∗DB(d
∗) > W∗FLL(d
∗, d). Now consider that the
ome failure function does not decrease with foreign deposits
(1) = P(2 − B) = p but welfare declines from having to insure
hose deposits when c > 0. Then WDB(r/R) = WFLL(r/R) and
DB(d) > WFLL(d) for d > (r/R). Similarly, W∗DB(d
∗) ≥ W∗HLL(d∗)
or d ≥ (r/R).
Second, observe that WDB(d) is declining in d independent of
*. Thus, d = r/R maximizes home welfare at WDB(r/R). Similarly,
* = (r/R), maximizes foreign welfare at W∗DB(r/R).
Lastly, world welfare is maximized by the sum WDB(r/R)+
∗
DB(r/R). Whereas FLL banking can generate equally high welfarenly reacted to asset fundamentals. In this scenario, the best response by the Irish
overnment is to raise its deposit insurance level even as it knows Germany must
atch it. Germany depositors have not panicked, but nevertheless the German gov-
rnment must volteface and raise its deposit insurance level as prudent defensive
easure against ﬂight to guaranteed high returns abroad.
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.2. Proof of Proposition 8
When p* − p ∈ [− ε/(R − r), ε*/(R − r)] policies (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R)
atisfy the condition dDB(d
∗) ≤ d ≤ d¯DB(d∗) for an essential DB Equi-
ibrium (see Proposition 6). This banking equilibrium maximizes
ndividual country welfare by Proposition 7. Other policy pairs (d*,
) /= (r/R, r/R) that satisfy dDB(d∗) ≤ d ≤ d¯DB(d∗) cannot be a policy
quilibrium as at least one government could increase welfare by
educing deposit insurance slightly.
Now consider (d*, d) where d > d¯DB(d∗). The home government
an increase its welfare by deviating to d̂ = max{(r/R), dDB(d∗)} <
. In Fig. 1, this new point (d∗, d̂) lies at the bottom edge of the
ssential DB Equilibrium corridor. Home welfare is greater because
DB(d̂) > WDB(d) ≥ max[WHLL(d∗, d), WFLL(d)] under Assumption
.
Finally consider policies (d*, d) where d < dDB(d
∗).The foreign
overnment can increase its welfare by deviating to d̂∗ < d∗, where
∗ implicitly solves d = d¯DB(d̂∗). Foreign welfare is greater because
∗
DB(d̂
∗) > W∗DB(d
∗) ≥ max[W∗FLL(d∗, d), W∗HLL(d∗)] under Assump-
ion 1.
.3. Proof of Proposition 9
The policy pair with the lowest deposit insurance rates
elfare dominates other policy pairs within any banking equilib-
ium. First consider (d*, d) = (1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)], (r/R)),
here d* corresponds to d¯DB(d∗) = (r/R). In Fig. 2, this pol-
cy pair is located at the bottom left corner of essential DB
quilibrium corridor. Consider deviations from this policy pair.
he foreign government can obtain other banking equilibria
y increasing its insurance rate, d* > 1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)].
etween dDB and dFLL the sunspot determines either the HLL
r FLL equilibrium. To the right of dFLL only the HLL Equi-
ibrium exists. However, the foreign government is best off
ith a DB Equilibrium because W∗DB(1 − (ε∗/p∗R) − (p/p∗)[1 −
r/R)]) > W∗DB(d
∗) ≥ max[W∗FLL(d∗, (r/R)), W∗HLL(d∗)]. Similarly, the
ome government cannot improve its welfare by increasing from
r/R) to d > (r/R), as d* > 1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)] and Assump-
ion 1 show WDB(r/R) > W∗DB(d) ≥ max[WFLL(d∗, d), WHLL(d)]. Now
uppose the foreign government reduces its insurance. Then
t enters a region where the sunspot determines either the
LL or FLL equilibrium. In this region, foreign welfare is maxi-
ized by setting d* = (r/R). The foreign government will choose
1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)], (r/R)) over point (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R),
f and only if q ≤ qDB or equivalently
qW∗HLL
(
r
R
)
+ (1 − q)W∗FLL
(
r
R
,
r
R
)
≤ W∗DB
(
1 − ε
∗
p∗R
− p
p∗
[
1 −
(
r
R
)])
hus, the policy pair (1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)], (r/R)) is the pol-
cy equilibrium if q ≤ qDB.
If q > qDB the foreign country maximizes welfare at d* = (r/R)
hen d = r/R. The policy pair (d*, d) = (r/R, r/R) is an policy equilib-
ium if the home government does not deviate. The best alternative,
ee Fig. 2, is (d¯HLL(r/R) + , (r/R)), where   > 0 is an inﬁnitesimal
ncrement which secures the FLL Equilibrium (in the region that
ies above the d¯HLL(d∗) line). The home government prefers (r/R,
/R) over (d¯HLL(r/R) + , (r/R)), if q ≤ qLL or, equivalentlyWHLL
(
r
R
,
r
R
)
+ (1 − q)WFLL
(
r
R
)
≥ WFLL
(
d¯HLL
(
r
R
))
hus, if qDB ≤ q ≤ qLL then (r/R, r/R) is the policy equilibrium.
G
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If q > qLL then the home government prefers d¯HLL(r/R) +  when
* = (r/R). But, this FLL Equilibrium cannot be a policy equilib-
ium; increasing d* inﬁnitesimally from (r/R) increases foreign
xpected welfare by moving to a region with HLL and FLL equilibria.
s q > qLL ≥ 0, welfare increases as W∗HLL(r/R) = (1 − p∗)R + p∗r ≥
∗
FLL((r/R), 1) > W
∗
FLL((r/R), d¯HLL(r/R)).
Other banking equilibria regions lie in the upper right hand
orner of Fig. 2 and include the DB Equilibrium. Since the DB Equi-
ibrium is the essential equilibrium, policies in these regions are
ominated by (d*, d) = (1 − (ε*/p*R) − (p/p*)[1 − (r/R)], (r/R)).
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